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Land and Justice
Cara Nine on how to decide where borders should be drawn
Territorial borders are one of the most signiﬁcant factors in human well-being. Whether one enjoys
basic freedoms, lives above a poverty line, or has access to basic medical care largely depends
on where one lives and under which political authority.
Since the location of borders makes such an impact, a fundamental question is: Where should
borders be drawn?
To justify the placement of borders, an inquiry can follow one of two broad approaches. First, one
could take existing or historical borders as a starting point, and use their location to assess the
ethical placement of borders. Alternatively, one could use something ethically ‘pure’—that is, not
tainted by historical arbitrariness, such as cultural integrity or nationality—to determine where
borders should be drawn. The former approach characterizes institutionalist theories, and the latter
approach, cultural theories.
Cultural theories draw borders around cultural groups. Avery Kolers advances one of the most
sophisticated versions of a cultural view. On Kolers’ account, territorial rights should be determined
by, ﬁrst, identifying relevant cultural groups, second, assessing the appropriate location of their
territory, and third, evaluating the ﬁtting size of the territory. A valid group under this theory is an
‘ethnogeographic community’, a group of people who share ‘culturally speciﬁc conceptions of the
land’, and whose ‘land-use practices densely and pervasively interact’. Nationalism presents a
more familiar version of the cultural view. Under nationalist theories, the relevant claimants are,
well, nations—groups of people who hold similar cultural, historical, and political identities. A
national territory includes those lands where the nation has a deep, formative historical
connection. A cultural homeland can be an important source of identity and value formation in
individuals, and hence a people’s connection bears signiﬁcant moral weight. Because of the
normative importance of maintaining a connection between the people and their cultural
homeland, a nation claims a prima facie moral claim to its national territory.
Using culture to explain borders has certain beneﬁts. Many individuals care about and identify with
cultures. From overwhelming allegiance, individuals are motivated to perform both ordinary and
extraordinary acts, like paying taxes and going to war. Additionally, the language of culture and
nationalism has given many minority groups a position from which they can ﬁght for recognition
against oppressive political institutions.
Although these beneﬁts seem worth holding onto, cultural views invite levelling criticisms. First,
endorsing cultural theories risks perverse incentives to incite war, genocide, and oppression. Most
of the genocidal massacres in recent history have been executed in the name of nationalism.
Second, the problem with using a culture to deﬁne borders is that the culture’s descriptive qualities
do not align with the normative claim to political power. Culture is signiﬁcant because it helps form
individual identity, and a cultural community gives a person a sense of history and background
identity against which individual choices can be made. If a person were to lose her culture, she
would be either stuck in a cultural vacuum or forced to undergo a painful assimilation into a new
culture. However, only focusing on cultural groups can’t capture everything that gives life meaning.
Religion, political ideology, family ties, professional ethos, and club ethos provide meaningful
identities for some individuals, ‘and how well an individual fares will in some cases be more
dependent upon the success of these identity-conferring groups than upon the ﬂourishing of her
nation’. Consequently, groups with cultural features have signiﬁcance and should be respected by
political institutions, but do not need to deﬁne those institutions.
Given the difﬁculties facing cultural theories, I’m moved to endorse something like an institutional
view. One of the strongest defenders of this kind of view is Allen Buchanan. On his account, state
borders should remain where they are, except in extraordinary circumstances. (In cases of
genocide or massive human rights violations, or unjust expansionism, for instance, a group may
have the right of secession, redrawing territorial borders.)
Buchanan’s version can be expressed as follows:
1. Territory A is defined by status quo borders.
2. State Alpha, shaped by Territory A, is a legitimate state. That is, it secures conditions of minimal justice
for its members.
3. If a state is legitimate (if it doesn’t perpetrate mass human rights violations or oppression), then it has a
moral claim to territorial rights as defined by status quo borders.
4. Given the above, State Alpha has a moral claim to Territory A.
So, where should borders be drawn?
Buchanan’s theory answers this question only in a circular way, in that it relies, in Premise 1, on
the status quo drawing of borders. Why should these borders be here? Buchanan answers:
because they are here. What is missing is the link between borders and a separate moral
explanation for why borders should be drawn in any particular ways.
My theory ﬁlls that gap using Lockean analysis.This theory draws an analogy between the
normative creation of territorial rights and the normative creation of property rights. In traditional
Lockean theory, a farmer labouring on the land comes to have property rights over that particular
piece of land. The property right is created because of the farmer’s value-producing interaction
with the land. Similarly, the state that creates justice within, and using the resources of, a territory
comes to have territorial rights over that particular territory. The Lockean theory draws a
connection between the location of borders and the creation of salient moral quality: justice. On
this Lockean theory, the collective capacity to establish justice within and over a territory counts as
value-creation. A particular territory is justiﬁed if the state within the territory secures conditions of
justice for its members. This theory avoids the circularity of Buchanan’s view by justifying the
location of borders through their moral qualities: their authentic role in establishing justice for the
people who live there.
However, my theory may still seem ignore what lies at the moral heart of border disputes: feelings
of nationality, culture, and a deep connection to a particular place. My theory cannot provide an
account of where borders should be alternatively located in advance of their being drawn. Rather,
they can only evaluate the justiﬁcation of existing borders.
But wait. What does it mean to provide an account of where borders should be drawn before
they’re drawn? Is that even possible? My colleague Joel Walmsley and I have argued that it’s not.
This is because political borders are emergent.
Emergent features of a system arise from the system’s parts, but the way they will emerge is
unpredictable before the fact. This also characterizes borders; borders are constituted by the
psychological, legal, and political factors that give rise to them, but given the complexity of
interactions between these ‘lower level’ features, the borders that emerge do so in ways that are
often unpredictable. This can be seen in at least two ways. First, the territorial border is a political
phenomenon. While the political event creating territorial borders may be connected with cultural
or other historical elements, the border itself is determined by a political process and ratiﬁed in
international law. This process involves a variety of unpredictable outcomes from negotiation,
compromise, consideration of external pressures, and the current balance of political power, and
so on. The political nature of the border reﬂects the essence of the territorial right, that it is a right
to political power. Thus, the nature of a border’s creation ﬁts with its primary function: both are
political. A border’s political creation comes about only after a historical process of emergence.
Second, once the border is created, it seems to play a causal role in the development of morally
relevant events. The creation of a national culture, for example, often forms around a people and a
territory that already exists. The culture is inﬂuenced by the borders in ways that it is not inﬂuenced
before the border comes into existence. Consequently, the effects of the borders seem to be
distinct from the effects of the events that cause the borders to come into existence. The individual
elements that make up the border do not appear to have the same causal capacities as a border
itself, once it has emerged (although I shall have more to say about this shortly).
In effect, the only way to ﬁgure out how these psychological, legal and political features will give
rise to a territorial border is to ‘run them and see’. Nonetheless, once a territorial border is in place
—once it has in fact emerged—one might, with some effort, retrospectively pick out the factors that
gave rise to it, in order to explain it after the fact; one might, for example, point to a particular
clause in a treaty and note how it was interpreted by a particular individual or group in order to
provide a legal rationale for the placement of the border.
The inability—or better, unwillingness—of institutionalist theories to specify where borders should
be placed in advance of their being drawn is a virtue of the theory, not a ﬂaw. Given the nature of
borders themselves, and the complexity of interactions that give rise to them, one simply cannot
address the normative question in advance of seeing where the borders have actually been
placed.
So, where should borders be drawn? The ﬁrst step in answering this question is to evaluate the
moral legitimacy of existing borders. Do the institutions within those borders create conditions of
justice within that domain? If yes, then the location of these borders is, ceters paribus, justiﬁed. If
not, then the lower-level factors that went into drawing those borders need to be examined to see
where they went wrong. Such an examination may reveal alternative political arrangements that
could serve as better institutions in the creation of geographical justice. 
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